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Impacts on U.S. Prices of Reducing Orange Juice Tariffs in 
Major World Markets
Mark G. Brown, Thomas H. Spreen, and Jonq-Ying Lee
A demand model is developed to examine the impacts on orange juice prices resulting from elimination or reduction of 
the tariffs on orange juice imposed by the United States, European Union, and Japan. An empirical analysis suggests 
that elimination of the U.S. tariff by itself would decrease the U.S. orange juice price by about $0.22 per gallon, while 
simultaneous elimination of the U.S., European, and Japanese tariffs would decrease the U.S. price by about $0.13 
per gallon. Alternatively, reducing these tariffs according to the Swiss 25 formula would decrease the U.S. price by 
an estimated $0.09 per gallon. The U.S. produces about 1.4 billion gallons of orange juice annually and each penny 
reduction in the price impact increases U.S. orange juice FOB revenue by $14 million.
Tariffs on orange juice (OJ) have been critical for 
the U.S. orange juice industry. In a recent study of 
the impact of the proposed Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) on world OJ markets, Spreen, 
Brewster, and Brown (2003) estimated that unilat-
eral elimination of the U.S. tariff on OJ imports 
from Brazil, the world’s largest OJ producer, 
would result in decreases in U.S. OJ prices for 
frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) and not-
from-concentrate orange juice (NFC) of $0.22 per 
single-strength equivalent (SSE) gallon and $0.21 
per SSE gallon, respectively. Elimination of the U.S. 
OJ tariffs would make the U.S. market relatively 
more proﬁtable to foreign exporters, increasing U.S. 
imports of foreign product and driving down U.S. 
OJ prices. In some ways, however, this is a worst-
case scenario, because, through World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) negotiations, other major importing 
countries may end up sacriﬁcing their OJ tariffs in 
order to obtain trade concessions from the United 
States. World markets where OJ tariffs are elimi-
nated or reduced would also become more attrac-
tive to exporters. Marginal proﬁts would increase 
in these markets and the ﬂow of imports into the 
United States would be expected to be moderated 
compared to the case where only the United States 
eliminated its tariffs.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how 
OJ prices may be impacted if tariffs are eliminated 
or reduced across the three major markets in the 
world—the United States, European Union, and 
Japan.1 The United States and Europe are the larg-
est OJ markets in the world, accounting for over 
40% and 35% of world consumption, respectively 
(Spreen, Brewster, and Brown 2003; USDA 2002). 
The Japanese market is much smaller but still sig-
niﬁcant, accounting for about 4% of world con-
sumption. Production of OJ is dominated by Brazil 
and the United States. In 2001–02, Brazil and the 
United States accounted for 51.6% and 39.6%, 
respectively, of the OJ produced in the major pro-
ducing countries in the world (USDA 2003a). The 
focus of this study is on the tariff impacts on U.S. 
and Brazil prices.
Two tariff-reduction scenarios are examined. 
First, total elimination of U.S., European Union 
and Japanese OJ tariffs is considered. Then, a par-
tial tariff-reduction scenario based on the Swiss 25 
formula proposed by the United States in WTO 
negotiations is discussed. The Swiss formula har-
monizes tariffs by lowering all tariffs across all 
countries to similar levels.
U.S., European Union, and Japanese OJ 
Tariffs 
Much of the orange juice imported into the United 
States is subject to a tariff. For 2003, the most-fa-
vored-nation (MFN) tariff rates for FCOJ and NFC 
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  1 Canada is also a significant market for OJ, with 
consumption levels as high as or higher than in Japan 
(Statistics Canada). Canada does not, however, impose a tariff 
on OJ imports, nor do they produce OJ, and was included in 
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are $0.297 and $0.170 per SSE gallon, respectively. 
These tariff rates declined by 15% from 1994 to 
2000 according to the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The MFN tariffs apply 
to Brazil, which is the largest producer of OJ in the 
world and is the dominant supplier of imported OJ 
to the U.S. market. U.S. OJ imports from Caribbean 
countries (CBERA), Andean Trade Preference Act 
countries (ATPA), Israel, African Growth and Oppor-
tunity Act countries (AGOA) including South Africa, 
and Canada are duty-free. OJ imports from Mexico 
receive preferential treatment as established by 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAF-
TA)—the ﬁrst 40 million SSE gallons of FCOJ and 
all NFC from Mexico are subject to reduced tariff 
rates; presently imports of FCOJ above the 40-mil-
lion-gallon level are subject to a tariff rate that is 
the same as the MFN tariff; the NAFTA tariffs on 
FCOJ and NFC are scheduled to decline to zero by 
2008 (Spreen and Mondragon 1996). 
OJ tariffs in the European Union and Japan are 
applied on an ad-valorem basis. The European tariff 
is 15.2%, while the Japanese tariff is 25.5%. These 
rates apply to the cost-insurance-freight (CIF) value 
of the import. The Japanese tariff has decreased 
by 15% since 1994 according to the GATT agree-
ment, while the European tariff has declined by 
20%. Europe also offers some trade preferences to 
select countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the 
Paciﬁc (Spreen, Brewster, and Brown 2003). The 
main beneﬁciaries of these trade preferences are 
Belize and Costa Rica.
Swiss 25 Formula
The WTO has considered various approaches to 
determine tariffs across countries, including the use 
of speciﬁc formulas. During the Kennedy Round 
(1963–67) negotiations, a simple formula of cutting 
tariffs by 50% was used, although some products 
were exempted and smaller tariff reductions were 
negotiated based on their economic sensitivity. In 
the Tokyo Round (1974–79) negotiations, a formula 
known as the Swiss formula, which reduces higher 
tariff rates by larger amounts in both absolute and 
relative terms, was used. The next round of nego-
tiations, the Uruguay Round (1986–94), was based 
on a less-speciﬁc approach—broad tariff reduction 
goals across product sectors leaving the distribution 
of cuts by product up to negotiations between trad-
ing partners. More recently, however, the United 
States has proposed using the Swiss formula again. 
This formula can be formally written as
(1)  T1 = T0/(T0 +  ),
where T1 is the new tariff and T0 is the current tariff 
rate. The parameter  is a ceiling tariff rate, the high-
est possible new rate. The U.S. proposal is known 
as the Swiss 25, as the ceiling rate  is set at 25% 
in the formula. 
Empirical Analysis of Price Impacts of U.S., 
European Union and Japanese OJ Tariffs
Model
In our empirical analysis, the world is divided into 
four markets—the United States, European Union, 
Japan, and the rest of the world (RW). Following 
Brown, Lee and Spreen (1996), the case where the 
United States, Europe, and Japan absorb all OJ 
produced domestically plus part of the production 
of the RW is considered. Imports in the analysis 
are assumed to be net (import-exports)—some 
exports/re-exports from major importing countries, 
even those in Europe that do not produce OJ from 
round oranges, to niche markets across the world 
will occur. 
Formally, let total supplies of OJ from the United 
States, European Union, Japan and the RW be de-
noted by q1, q2, q3, and q4, respectively.2 Japanese 
OJ production is insigniﬁcant at less than 0.2% of 
its domestic consumption (USDA 2003a). Supplies 
across the world are assumed to be ﬁxed and the 
short-run adjustment process of allocating them 
across markets is considered.
The demand for OJ in each market is speciﬁed as 
a function of the price of OJ and cost margins includ-
ing the tariff in that market. The quantity demanded 
in the United States is speciﬁed as f1(p + c1 + t1) 
where p is the price in the RW measured by the 
Brazilian FOB price, c1 is the transportation cost 
from the RW to the United States, and t1 is the U.S. 
tariff. The FOB price in the United States is p + c1 + 
t1. As most U.S. imports are FCOJ, only the FCOJ 
tariff is considered—NFC import levels are minor 
  2 Duty-free OJ imports from nearby CBERA countries, as 
well as from Mexico in the future when the NAFTA tariff rates 
go to zero, can be treated as part of U.S. domestic production 
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because the transportation cost of importing NFC 
is much greater than for FCOJ. The United States 
is assumed to have excess demand; that is, f1(p + 
c1 + t1) > q1.
The quantities of OJ demanded in the European 
Union and Japan are speciﬁed as f2 ((p + c2)(1+ 
t2)) and f3 ((p + c3)(1+ t3)), respectively, where p 
is again the FOB price in the RW; c2 and c3 are 
transportation costs from the RW to the European 
Union and Japan, respectively; and t2 and t3 are the 
European Union and Japanese ad-valorem tariff 
rates, respectively. The (after-tariff) FOB prices in 
Europe and Japan are (p + c2)(1+ t2) and (p + c3)(1+ 
t3), respectively. Europe and Japan are assumed to 
have excess demand; that is, f2 ((p + c2)(1+ t1)) > q2 
and f3 ((p + c3)(1+ t1)) > q3.
The quantity demanded for OJ in the RW is 
speciﬁed as f4 (p). The RW is assumed to have 
excess supply; that is, f4 (p) < q4. 
These excess supply and demand assumptions 
are descriptive of the world OJ situation over the last 
decade and are assumed to hold with or without the 
U.S., European, and Japanese tariffs. In the future, 
however, excess supply and demand conditions may 
change across markets.
The quantities of OJ produced in the United 
States, European Union, and Japan are assumed to 
be consumed domestically in each market. On the 
other hand, the RW is assumed to export OJ to each 
of these markets as well as to supply the RW, receiv-
ing the same net price p in each market. Prices are 
determined by equating excess supply and demand. 
U.S., European, and Japanese excess demands vary 
inversely with p, while the quantity of excess supply 
in the RW varies directly with p, given negatively 
sloped demands (fi/p < 0 i = 1, ..., 4).
Setting RW excess supply equal to aggregate 
U.S., European Union, and Japanese excess demand 
results in a world supply-demand equilibrium equa-
tion
(2)  [q4- f4 (p)] = [f1(p + c1 + t1)-q1] + [f2 ((p + c2)(1+ 
         t2))-q2] + [f3 ((p + c3)(1+ t3))-q3].
Collecting supply and demand terms separately, 
equation (1) can be alternatively written as total 
world supply equals total world demand. Assum-
ing an interior solution, the impact of the U.S., 
European Union, and Japanese tariffs on price can 
be determined straightforwardly from this equa-
tion; changes in the tariffs result in a change in the 
equilibrium price level p that equates excess supply 
and demand. 
Unilateral elimination or reduction of the U.S. 
tariff makes it more proﬁtable for the RW to real-
locate its OJ from the RW, Europe, and Japan to the 
United States. As OJ is taken out of these world mar-
kets for reallocation to the United States, p increases 
until a new equilibrium is reached. Similarly, elimi-
nation or reduction of the European and Japanese 
tariffs reallocates RW OJ from RW markets without 
tariff changes and from the United States for export 
to Europe and Japan. To determine the impacts of 
these tariff changes on prices, totally differentiate 
the equilibrium equation (2) with respect to prices 
and tariffs, holding supply constant, and ﬁnd
(3)  0 = f1/p(dp+dt1) + f2 /p (dp) + f2 /p
    (((p+c2)/(1+ t2))dt2) + f3 /p (dp) + f3 /p 
    (((p+c3)/(1+t3))dt3) + f4 /p (dp).
Solving the above result for dp, 
(4)  dp = -w1(dt1) - w2 (((p + c2)/(1+ t2))dt2) -
      w3 (((p + c3)/(1+ t3))dt3),
where w1 = (f1/p)/(f/p), w2 = ( f2/p)/(f/p), 
and w3 = ( f3/p)/(f/p), with f/p = f1/p + 
f2/p + f3/p + f4/p. The derivative f/p is the 
world price slope and the term wi is the ith market’s 
contribution or share of the world price slope. 
Hence, the change in the U.S. price is
(5)  dp + dt1 = (1- w1) dt1 - w2 ((p + c2)/(1+ t2))dt2
             - w3 ((p + c3)/(1+ t3))dt3.
Based on results (4) and (5), if all demand slopes 
(fi/p, i = 1, ..., 4) are changed proportionally—say 
doubled—each market’s share of the world price 
slope (wi) is unchanged, and the impacts of the 
U.S., European, and Japanese tariffs on prices are 
also unchanged. That is, the relative, not absolute, 
magnitudes of the market-demand slopes are the 
determining factors.
When estimates of the market-price slopes are 
unavailable, a simple approach to determine the 
market shares of the world-price slope is to assume 
the price elasticities across markets are all the same 
in which case wi becomes the volume shares.3 
Based on result (5), as the U.S. share of the world 
price slope (w1) declines, the impact of the U.S. 
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case where the U.S. share approaches zero (the 
United States becomes a price taker), the impact 
on price is the full amount of the U.S. tariff, with 
the European Union and Japanese tariffs unchanged 
(dti = 0; i = 2, 3).
Demand Estimates
Estimates of the price slopes by market are required 
to apply equations (4) and (5). In this study, the U.S. 
price slope is based on an estimate of the U.S. price 
elasticity of demand for OJ reported by Brown, Lee 
and Spreen (2003). The price slopes for the other 
markets are based on price elasticity estimates 
obtained by applying the seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) method to Brazil export data. 
In this analysis, the natural logarithm of Brazil’s 
FCOJ exports by destination was regressed on the 
natural logarithm of Brazil’s CIF price,4 and time. 
Data from 1990–91 through 2000–01 reported by 
ABECitrus (an association of Brazilian processors) 
were used. The Japanese price elasticity was based 
on exports to Asia, as Japanese exports were not 
reported separately. In the equations for the Euro-
pean Union and Japan, the Brazil price, expressed 
in dollars, was transformed to Francs5 and Yen, 
respectively, based on the exchange rates for these 
two currencies. The general demand speciﬁcation 
in the set of SUR equations can be written as
(6)  log (Qj) = j0 + j1 log(pj* rj) + j2 t,   j=2, 3, 4,
where Qj is the quantity of Brazilian exports to mar-
ket j; j=2, 3, and 4 for the European Union, Asia and 
the RW (excluding NAFTA countries), respectively; 
pj is the Brazil CIF price; r is the exchange rate 
(Francs for Europe, Yen for Asia, unity for the RW); 
t is time; and j0, j1 and j2 are intercepts, price elas-
ticities, and growth rate coefﬁcients, respectively. 
Time was excluded from the Japanese equation, as 
it was not signiﬁcantly different from zero at any 
reasonable level of signiﬁcance. The estimates are 
shown in Table 1. All coefﬁcient estimates were sig-
niﬁcant at the  = 5% level of signiﬁcance, except 
the estimate of the price elasticity for the RW—OJ 
exports to the RW were subject to a strong trend, 
and in comparison, price appears to be a relatively 
minor factor.
Total Elimination of OJ Tariffs
Based on the elasticity estimates and on data from 
the USDA (2003b) and the Florida Department of 
Citrus (FDOC) (2003), equation (5) was used to es-
timate the impacts of the U.S., European Union, and 
Japanese tariffs on the U.S. price of OJ as shown in 
Table 2. The last two columns of this table show the 
estimated impacts of the tariffs on prices; the ﬁrst 
six columns of the table show underlying market 
parameters. For each market, the price slope was 
estimated as that market’s price-elasticity estimate 
times the market quantity divided by the market 
price (columns one through four of Table 2); price 
slopes are assumed to be the same at different levels 
of the marketing chain—e.g., FOB, import, retail. 
Column 5 of Table 2 shows each market’s estimated 
share of the world price slope based on the previous 
column estimates. Column 6 shows each market’s 
tariff-change term in equations (4) and (5)—dt1 for 
the United States, ((p + c2)/(1+ t2))dt2 for Europe, 
and ((p + c3)/(1+ t3))dt3 for Japan. Column 7 shows 
the estimated market-speciﬁc components for equa-
tion (4), the impacts of the tariffs on world price 
p; column 8 shows the estimated market-speciﬁc 
components for equation (5), the impact of the tar-
iffs on the U.S. price. The totals of these last two 
columns show the price impacts when all tariffs 
are eliminated.
If only the U.S. tariff were eliminated, the RW 
price is estimated to increase by $0.079 per SSE 
gallon, while the U.S. price is estimated to decrease 
by $0.218 per SSE gallon. These estimates are simi-
lar to those found by Spreen, Brewster, and Brown 
(2003). Additionally, elimination of the European 
Union tariff results in an estimated increase in the 
RW price of $0.071 per SSE gallon, while elimina-
  3 The market price slope share is wi = (fi/p)/(j fj/p) 
= [(fi/p)(p/fi)fi]/(j (fj/p)(p/fj)fj) = fi/jfj when the price 
elasticity (fj/p)(p/fj) is equal across j.
  4 The CIF price was measured by the Rotterdam FCOJ 
price for exports to Europe and the RW, and the Rotterdam price 
plus an additional $0.08 per SSE gallon transportation cost for 
exports to Japan. Transportation costs from the RW (Brazil) to 
the United States and Europe are about the same, estimated at 
$0.10 per SSE gallon, while the cost from the RW to Japan is 
estimated at about $0.18 per SSE gallon.
  5 Although arbitrary, use of the Franc exchange rate in 
the regression analysis is representative of exchange-rate 
movements in Europe to the extent that the Franc-dollar 
exchange rate and other European exchange rates were highly 
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tion of the Japanese tariff results in an estimated 
increase in the RW price of $0.015 per SSE gallon, 
which in turn would increase the U.S. price by the 
same amounts. Hence, elimination of the U.S., 
European, and Japanese tariffs would decrease 
the U.S. FOB price for OJ by an estimated $0.132 
per SSE gallon or $0.086 per SSE gallon less than 
the impact of the losing the U.S. tariff only.6 This 
reduction in the negative impact of losing only the 
U.S. tariff is an estimate of the gain that might be 
obtained through negotiations that eliminate OJ 
tariffs across countries.
Table 1. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates of Export Demand for FCOJ in the European 
Union, Asia, and the RW (Excluding the U.S. and Other NAFTA Countries).a
Region Parameter Estimate Approximate
standard error
European Union 20   16.737 1.417
21   -0.410 0.158
22   0.053 0.008
Asia 30   17.204 2.525
31   -0.471 0.210
RW 40   10.677 2.787
41  -0.109 0.379
42   0.061 0.021
a R-square values for European, Asia, and the RW were .84, .33, and .56, respectively.
Table 2. Estimates of Quantity-Price OJ Demand Slopes in U.S., European Union, Japanese, and RW 



















- - - - - - - $/SSE gallon - - - - - - -
U.S. 1,515 4.25 -.70 -250 26.6% 0.297 0.079 -0.218
Europe 1,230 .90 -.41 -561 59.8% 0.119 0.071 0.071
Japan 145 .98 -.47 -70 7.4% 0.199 0.015 0.015
RW 483 .90 -.11 -58 6.2%
TOTAL 3,373 .90 -.25 -938 100.0% 0.165 -0.132
a Market consumption based on data reported by the FDOC (2003), and by the USDA (2002).
b Retail price for United States, based on ACNielsen data; Rotterdam Bulk FCOJ price for Europe and RW (tariff not paid), based 
on data reported by Foodnews; Rotterdam price plus a transportation differential for Japan. 
c Estimated as price elasticity times market gallons divided by market price; price slopes are assumed to be the same at different 
levels of the marketing chain; e.g., FOB, import, retail. 
d For United States, absolute tariff; for Europe and Japan, ad-valorem-tariff term in equation (5): ((Brazil CIF price for bulk 
FCOJ)/(1+ad-valorem rate))(ad-valorem rate).
6 The simple approach to calculating the world price-slope 
shares provides a somewhat similar result—measuring wi in 
equation (5) by the volume shares, the U.S. OJ price decreases 
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Swiss 25 Tariff Reductions 
Alternatively, OJ price impacts resulting from 
partial tariff reductions according to the Swiss 25 
formula are shown in Table 3. These results are 
based on a U.S. CIF import price for bulk FCOJ of 
$0.90 per SSE gallon. In this case, the ad-valorem 
equivalent of the U.S. tariff is 33% (FCOJ tariff 
of $0.297 per SSE gallons divided by $0.90 per 
SSE gallon). Application of the Swiss 25 formula 
reduces the U.S., European Union and Japanese OJ 
tariffs by 18.8%, 5.7%, and 12.9%, respectively 
(Columns 1–3 of Table 3). Column 5 shows each 
market’s estimated tariff-change term for equations 
(4) and (5); while Column 6 shows again each mar-
ket’s estimated share of the world price slope used 
in these equations. Column 7 shows the estimated 
impacts on the world price based on equation (4), 
while Column 8 shows the estimated impacts on the 
U.S. price. The estimates in the last column show 
that the Swiss 25 tariff changes would lead to an 
estimated reduction in the U.S. price of $0.09 per 
SSE gallon. Hence, these results suggest that use of 
the Swiss 25 formula would cut the negative impact 
on the U.S. price by more than half, compared to the 
scenario where only the United States eliminated 
its tariffs on OJ.
 
Qualiﬁcations/Extensions
The results shown in Tables 2 and 3 are based on 
the assumption that the United States, European 
Union, and Japan have excess demand for OJ with 
or without tariffs. For Europe and especially Japan, 
extending this assumption into the future seems 
reasonable, as their production levels are relatively 
small compared to their consumption levels. U.S. 
OJ production, however, is relatively large, and 
various corner solutions are possible (Takayama and 
Judge 1971). In some world supply-demand situa-
tions, U.S. imports, other than for blending, may be 
zero with or without the U.S. tariff, in which case the 
U.S. OJ price might be determined by U.S. produc-
tion only; or, for some large U.S. production levels, 
the United States may become a net exporter, with 
the U.S. price becoming the world price. Another 
possibility is that imports are zero with the tariff 
but some positive amount without the tariff.The 
analysis of this study has also examined the impact 
of tariffs under the short-run assumption that supply 
is not a function of price. Orange-tree populations 
across producing countries, along with weather, 
largely determine OJ production in the current year 
independent of prices. OJ prices are assumed to be 
high enough for growers to maintain groves and tree 
yields, as has generally been the case historically. 
Production for the next several years also tends to 
be independent of prices. Trees under three years 
old generally do not produce a signiﬁcant amount 
of fruit to be commercially harvested, and produc-
tion for the next several years is largely dependent 
on maturation of the current tree populations (yield 
per tree tends to increase with age) and tree losses. 
In upcoming years, higher-than-average tree losses 
Table 3. Tariff Impacts on Prices, Based on Swiss 25 Formula.
Market













Currenta Newb Change - - $/SSE gallon - - - - - $/SSE gallon - - -
U.S. 33.0%  14.2%   -18.8% 0.90 -0.169  26.6%   0.045   -0.124
Europe 15.2%   9.5%  -5.7% 0.90 -0.045  59.8%   0.027   0.027
Japan 25.5%  12.6%   -12.9% 0.98 -0.101   7.4%   0.007   0.007
TOTAL   0.079   -0.090
a U.S. ad-valorem rate was estimated as the U.S. FCOJ tariff of $0.297 per SSE gallon divided by an assumed tariff-not-paid FCOJ 
import price of $0.90 per SSE gallon.
b Based on Swiss 25 formula: 0.25*current tariff/(0.25+current tariff).
c Tariff-not-paid CIF price for bulk FCOJ.
d For United States, the ad-valorem tariff-change times the tariff-not-paid import price of $0.90 per SSE gallon; for Europe and Japan, 
the ad-valorem-tariff term in equation (5): ((Brazil CIF price for bulk FCOJ)/(1+ad-valorem rate))(ad-valorem rate change).
e See Table 2 for calculations.32   July 2004 Journal of Food Distribution Research 35(2)
are expected as a result of diseases in Brazil and 
the United States. Trees are being lost to the citrus 
tristeza virus (CTV) and canker in Florida and to 
citrus chlorosis variegated (CVC) and “sudden 
death of citrus” in Brazil. Tree losses to diseases 
combined with maturing tree populations may even 
keep orange production relatively ﬂat or possibly 
result in production declines in upcoming years 
(FDOC 2001).
In the long run, prices may have a notable impact 
on production through planting rates, and following 
Spreen, Brewster, and Brown (2003), extension of 
our model to the long run is straightforward. The 
latter study found a strong, positive relationship 
between tree-planting levels in Florida and previ-
ous-season grower prices. A similar relationship was 
found for Brazil. Hence, following their approach, 
price levels determined in the short run along with 
past prices might be used to determine planting lev-
els, which in turn might be used to determine future 
production in a forward recursive manner.
Concluding Comments
This study examined how the U.S. OJ price might 
change if tariffs in the United States, European 
Union, and Japan were eliminated or reduced ac-
cording to the Swiss 25 formula. Spreen, Brewster, 
and Brown (2003) found in an earlier study that 
elimination of the U.S. tariff by itself would reduce 
the price of OJ by $0.21 per SSE gallon to $0.22 per 
SSE gallon, depending on product form. The pres-
ent study conﬁrms this result and further ﬁnds that 
simultaneous elimination of the U.S., European, and 
Japanese tariffs would decrease the U.S. OJ price by 
an estimated $0.13 per SSE gallon, or about $0.09 
per SSE gallon less than if only the U.S. tariff were 
eliminated. Alternatively, if OJ tariffs are reduced 
according to the Swiss 25 formula, the U.S. price 
is estimated to decline by $0.09 per SSE gallon, 
or $0.13 per SSE gallon less than if only the U.S. 
tariff were lost.
These results provide an indication of the value 
that may be obtained through multilateral trade ne-
gotiation. If the United States ﬁnds that it may lose 
its OJ tariffs, a secondary strategy should include 
seeking OJ-tariff reductions in other world market. 
Given that the United States typically produces 1.4 
billion SSE gallons per year, each penny reduction 
in the adverse price impact of losing the U.S. tariff 
is worth $14 million to U.S. OJ industry. Thus, the 
roughly $0.09-per-SSE-gallon savings obtained 
by eliminating the European and Japanese tariffs 
translates into a $126 million gain to the U.S. OJ 
industry. Similarly, the $0.13-per-SSE-gallon dif-
ference in the price reductions for eliminating only 
the U.S. tariff versus reducing tariffs in these major 
markets based on the Swiss 25 formula is worth 
$182 million.
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